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Abstract 
An extensive review of the policy science and adaptive management literature reveals 
that little theoretical and empirical scholarship has been conducted to investigate the 
role of experiments in policy making and how they relate to policy learning. This is 
remarkable as policy experimentation is regularly, and favourably, referred to. This 
paper helps get a firmer grip on experiments in climate governance by presenting a 
novel and rigorous conceptualization and a systematic exploration of the link between 
experiment design in institutional terms and learning effects. Policy experiments are 
here defined as temporary, controlled field-trials of a policy-relevant innovation that 
produce evidence for subsequent policy decisions. In order to advance our 
understanding of experiments, a three way typology of experiments is proposed, 
which is informed by the policy science and science-policy interface literature: the 
technocratic, boundary, and advocacy (ideal) types. Institutional factors are used to 
demarcate the types, including their boundary, information, and choice rules as 
outlined by Ostrom (2005). A technocratic experiment effectively looks to separate 
science from power and is mainly aimed at the production of objective and 
generalizable scientific information. A boundary experiment embodies transparent, 
deliberative and inclusive processes and produces policy-relevant knowledge. In 
contrast, the advocacy experiment attempts to steer the process by restricting 
information distribution, limiting the authority of participants and protecting 
prevailing norms, and produces knowledge that supports a pre-determined outcome 
(see McFadgen and Huitema, in review).  
Experiments are intended for learning, and policy learning will here be conceptualized 
as a measured change of understanding in the mind of an individual who is part of a 
policy community. In this paper we aim to gauge learning effects and we do so by 
developing hypotheses on how the three types of experiments might be connected to 
various types of learning. We borrow from new advances in the literature  aimed at 
isolating certain factors that affect learning, such as the level of diversity of actors; the 
openness and sustained exchange of information; the degree to which control over the 
process/joint fact-finding is shared; the presence of facilitation; and the existence of 
consensus decision making (Mostert et al. 2007; Gerlak and Heikkila 2011; Muro and 
Jeffrey 2012; Leach et al. 2013; Baird et al. 2014).  The key and novel hypothesis 
advanced here is that technocratic experiments produce high cognitive learning, no 
normative learning, and some relational learning, while evidence emanating from this 
type of experiment will be perceived in the policy network as credible. We hypothesize 
that boundary experiments produce some cognitive learning, high normative learning, 
and high relational learning, and that the evidence produced will be perceived as 
salient and legitimate. We finally submit that  advocacy types will produce low 
cognitive, some normative, and low relational learning, and evidence that is salient. 
An empirical study investigated the use of policy experiments in the Dutch climate 
adaptation policy field and found 18 experiment cases out of 174 innovative 
initiatives, indicating that experiments are actually quite a rare phenomenon in this 
field. The experiments tested policy concepts tackling coastal, flooding, drought, and 
fresh water availability issues and were dated from 1997-2012. An assessment based 
on 20 institutional indicators revealed that four experiments can be classified as 
technocratic, seven as boundary type, and seven as advocacy type. This is far fewer 
technocratic and far more boundary types than expected, indicating that experiments 
are used to bring different actor types into the policy process, and they produce more 
policy relevant knowledge than strictly scientific knowledge. It also found that 
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experiments vary in terms of their social, bureaucratic, and political dynamics; 
including how open they were to outsiders, the legal barriers they faced, and how 
controversial their intentions were. 
An analysis of resultant learning shows that ideal types produce significantly different 
learning effects and that the hypotheses are largely met. However, in all experiments 
there was very little change in the values and norms of participants (compare Huitema 
et al., 2009), which raises questions as to why a deliberative setting could not 
encourage this form of normative learning. The technocratic type produced most 
cognitive learning but conversely a boundary experiment produced the least cognitive 
learning, illuminating a possible trade-off between knowledge acquisition and trust 
building. As expected, advocacy experiments produced the least relational and 
normative learning, and were significantly less likely to be controversial, indicating the 
policy actors may use this design for structured, uncontentious policy issues.  
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1 Introduction 
Climate pressures are causing policy makers in environmental governance sectors to 
search for new and improved approaches to managing climate change. In particular, 
adaptation is gaining traction as the new policy focus alongside mitigation, and like for 
other environmental concerns, learning is encouraged as a success criterion (Baird et 
al. 2014).  
Learning is a popular research subject, with theoretical underpinnings in the academic 
fields of sociology, education, commerce, and environment; thus scholars call for 
clarity on its use ( Reed et al. 2010; Rodela 2011; Leach et al. 2013). For the purposes 
of this research, policy learning is defined as: “relatively enduring alterations of 
thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and that are concerned 
with the attainment (or revision) of public policy” (Sabatier 1988) and one enabler of 
this sort of learning is experimentation. Experimentation brings new and reliable 
knowledge into the policy process by testing innovative policy options on a short term 
basis without committing to a specific course of action, thereby improving 
understanding of alternative approaches. It has the potential to save money and save 
face, by detecting unexpected consequences before policy commitments are made 
(Voß & Bourneman 2011; Tassey 2014). How experimentation might enable learning is 
a research question not often tackled in environmental governance literature, and it 
spawns further questions, such as: what might this learning look like; and are there 
factors that are more important than others in generating learning outcomes? 
Against this backdrop, the aim of this article is to investigate whether there is a 
relationship between the way experiments are designed and the kinds of learning 
effects they generate. The research builds on recent studies of learning in 
environmental governance, such as Muro & Jeffrey, 2012; Leach et al. 2013; and Baird 
et al. 2014, where learning is explicitly conceptualised and measured in specifically 
chosen learning situations. However, this research departs from the studies listed 
above due to the observed setting. Baird et al. (2014) examines learning in a 
participatory decision making process, Leach et al. (2013) in collaborative 
partnerships, and Muro and Jeffrey (2012) in participatory work groups. In contrast, 
this study compares learning outcomes in three alternative settings, thereby allowing 
us to ask, among other questions, how much better are participatory institutional 
settings for learning than other institutional designs? 
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2 Theory and framework 
2.1 Experiments 
The necessity for governments to get their policy decisions right first time is greater 
than ever, with climate change and other urgent environmental issues pushing hard on 
the policy agenda. Science and expertise is called upon to enlighten policy actors on 
what risks we face and what consequences their decisions will have and whole 
industries have been built around this service to government.  
One method governments can employ to aid their decision making role is by 
commissioning experiments. Policy experimentation has an extensive political and 
academic history, with analyses conducted since the 1960s when the idea of the Big 
Society took shape. DT Campbell was one of the first to kick against what he saw as 
policy decisions being taken without the risk of criticism or failure and he advocated 
the use of policy evaluation; the most rigorous form being the random controlled 
experiment (Campbell 1998). The method gained traction and during the following 
decades experimental interventions were conducted in an attempt to improve 
economic, health, and education policy, particularly in the US and UK. Scientific 
experts designed the experiments and conducted them on citizens to generate 
evidence of what policies work to minimise social problems. Criticisms of the use of 
experiments essentially revolved around ethical issues of such experiments and the 
belief that the complexities of the social world could be understood and managed 
through such a limiting prism (e.g. Fischer 1995; Sanderson 2002), after all the real 
world cannot confine itself to laboratory type conditions (e.g. no true generalizability 
or counterfactual). Thus, any results from social policy experiments could not be 
considered reliable and the method lost support.  
In environmental policy, another discussion about experimentation took place under 
the adaptive management approach. Here, experimentation was also supposed to 
provide reliable evidence about policy interventions that worked, but the focus was on 
policy actors and experts working together in experiments and later extended to 
incorporating a broader range of non-state actors in the adaptive co-management 
approach (Lee 1999; Armitage et al. 2008; Huitema et al. 2009).  
A third, broader understanding of experiments has recently emerged that focuses less 
on generating reliable evidence and more on seeking innovative policy approaches. 
Climate experiments and transitions management experiments aim to implement 
novel solutions within spaces either protected by market forces or outside the ordinary 
policy process (Berkhout et al. 2010; Castán Broto & Bulkeley 2013). A broad range of 
actors are brought into the process and seek to change policy actions through the 
implementation of shadow networks (Meijerink & Huitema 2007).  
These three understandings of experimentation emphasise varying degrees of its 
testing and novelty function, but have in common the positive characteristic of being 
flexible, in that they are not implemented on a full scale and are reversible (Tassey 
2014). A useful definition that captures these varying characteristics of policy 
experimentation is: 
“a temporary, controlled field-trial of a policy-relevant innovation that produces 
evidence for subsequent policy decisions”. 
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Graph 1 Comparison of experiment conceptualisations against the axes of testing 
and novelty, to show concept diversity. The test axis refers to the extent an 
experiment type emphasises the role of monitoring and control; and 
novelty refers to the extent a concept emphasises innovation. These 
categorizations are rough and their placement in the two-dimensional 
graph should be seen as approximate (taken from Crona & Parker, 2012).  
This research concentrates on experiments that have a testing function and relate to 
policy by producing evidence for public policy decisions. The relevance to policy is 
important because of this report’s focus on the positioning of experiments as 
institutional arrangements at the science policy interface. 
Use in policy development 
One recognisable function of an experiment is its intention to provide evidence of how 
an alternative policy approach will work. In environmental governance, understanding 
how both the social as well as ecological system will behave is crucial, and by 
implementing a project on a temporary basis and monitoring it for effects we enhance 
our understanding of relevant social-ecological system dynamics, as well as the policy 
approaches to see if they deliver desired outcomes (Steffen 2009). This flexibility 
allows us to govern better under uncertainty (Anderies and Janssen 2013). In the 
literature uncertainty has been disaggregated into three types: incomplete knowledge, 
unpredictability of the system, and ambiguity of the solution (van Hoek et al. 2013) 
and by picking up data on the intervention’s actual effects, experimentation can 
arguably address all three forms. 
Experiments might not only lay evidence at the feet of policy makers, they may also 
provide the opportunity for the divergent worlds of policy actor and expert to mix and 
discover new ways to manage the environment. As discussed above experiments vary 
in to what extent they involve other actors. If used as a platform to invite other actors 
into the policy process then experiments can enable creative inquiry and discovery, 
and the inclusion of public judgement in policy decision making (Dryzek 1987; 
Caspary 2002). Experiments offer the opportunity to involve other knowledge types 
and other points of view; involving stakeholders that might otherwise oppose (Lee, 
1993; Petersen et al. 2011). 
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Finally, there is a political aspect that, despite attempts to make experiments appear 
neutral, cannot be ignored. On behalf of society the state determines what issues sit 
on the policy agenda and this status is often a driver of the choice to commission an 
experiment. Experiments are conducted to gather evidence but that evidence may be 
used to support a predetermined decision and soften objections, since a temporary 
change that is reversible provides a sense of security and renders actors less resistant 
to policy change (Vedung 1997; Tassey 2014). Experiments can be used to push an 
idea or maintain an idea on the policy agenda, or they could be used as a tool to delay 
making final decisions (Greenberg et al. 2003). 
2.2 Learning 
In the policy sciences and environmental governance literatures, learning has emerged 
as a mainstay for improving decision making (Cundhill and Rodela 2012; Leach et al. 
2013). It can lead to preferred states, like increased adaptive capacity (Lebel et al. 
2010) or it can be a normative outcome in itself; i.e. embodying a change in thought in 
a policy community from new knowledge (Huitema et al. 2010). Drawing on Lee (1999) 
two associations come to mind when considering learning in relation to experiments. 
First, an experiment’s monitoring and testing mechanisms aim to produce acute and 
accelerated knowledge production, improving understanding of the social and 
ecological systems response to an intervention. Second, owing to its novelty an 
experiment may be seen as a unique configuration of issues and participants, with the 
potential to create new actor networks that engage non-state actors in a policy 
decision making process (Leach et al. 2013).  
It is important to the advancement of learning theory that researchers are explicit as to 
what learning they are focusing on (Leach et al. 2013). As Crona and Parker (2011) 
lament, there is little consensus on learning definitions nor on factors that foster 
learning. However, in recent years scholars of environmental governance have been 
making a specific attempt to categorise and measure learning among individuals, often 
in participatory settings (for a discussion on the difference between this 
conceptualisation and broader learning settings, such as network or systems centric 
perspective, see Rodela 2012). Three studies of learning in particular have sought to 
define learning and better understand triggers that encourage it, namely Muro and 
Jeffrey (2012); Leach et al. (2013); and Baird et al. (2014). 
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3 Conceptual framework 
With these conceptual understandings in mind, the main research question 
investigated by this article is: 
To what extent can policy learning be explained by an experiment’s institutional 
design?  
In order to answer the question, an hypothesis is constructed that proposes learning is 
dependent on the type of design an experiment has. The dependent variables are three 
different learning effects important to policy development, measured at the level of 
participant in an experiment. The three effects are: cognitive, normative, and relational 
learning (Huitema et al. 2010; Haug et al. 2011; Baird et al. 2014b). Cognitive learning 
refers to an individual’s knowledge acquisition and increased complexity of 
understanding. New information serves both advocacy and enlightenment functions for 
policy making (Grin and Loeber 2007) and cognitive learning represents the uptake of 
new knowledge that reduces uncertainty of an experiment’s effects on the social-
ecological system. Normative learning refers to a change in an individual’s values, 
goals, or belief systems, with value in building a common interest among participants 
(Leach et al. 2013). Relational learning is understood as an improvement in 
understanding of others’ mindsets and an increase in trust and cooperation, with trust 
being a vital component in governing social-ecological systems (Poteete, Janssen and 
Ostrom 2010). 
Table 1 Policy learning effects, their definitions, and added value to the policy 
process.  
Typology of policy 
learning  
Definition Value to policy process: 
Cognitive learning Acquisition of new knowledge 
and restructuring of existing 
knowledge 
Reduces uncertainty. Information 
provides advocacy and enlightenment 
functions.  
Normative learning Change in norms, values, 
goals. 
Synthesis of priorities between 
individuals about the policy issue that 
leads to a common interest or goal 
built within the group.  
Relational learning Enhanced trust, improved 
understanding of mind-sets 
of others. 
Importance of trust in governing 
social-ecological systems. 
 
The hypothesis’s independent variables are experiment types that draw on institutional 
rules provided by Ostrom (2005); i.e. those of an action situation that determine who 
is involved (boundary rules), what authority they have (choice rules), what information 
they share (information rules), and what positions they hold (position rules, pay-off 
rules). These rules can be set at different modes, which collectively delineate three 
types of design based on concepts drawn from the science-policy interface and policy 
sciences (Dryzek 1987; Pielke 2007). The ideal types are explained below and table 2 
sets out more detail with the different rule settings for each of the types. The 
hypothesis is shown in figures 1 and 2, followed by explanation of the theory 
underpinning it. 
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Technocratic type 
A technocratic experiment resembles the technical-rational model of policy making, 
where there is a separation of power between the experts who provide knowledge and 
the policy actors who make decisions based on that knowledge (Owens et al. 2004). 
Scientists play a vital but objective and disconnected role in politics as ‘pure scientists’ 
(Pielke 2007). Expert actors are the initiators and sole participants of a technocratic 
experiment and maintain control over its design, monitoring, and evaluation. Although 
policy actors are commissioners of the research, they are absent or supporting the 
experts and do not have decision authority. Scientific knowledge is the sole type of 
information generated by the experiment and there is no constructing or reflection on 
policy goals as they are already established by policy actors in advance.  
Advocacy type 
In contrast, an advocacy experiment is initiated and controlled by policy actors and is 
used to transfer select information and bring particular actors into the policy process 
in a form of ‘stealth advocacy’ (Pielke 2007). Although appearing neutral, the 
experiment supports particular outcomes as participants must be invited and outsiders 
are barred from gaining access (Owens et al. 2004). Participating actor types may be 
diverse but they are carefully selected to provide specialist knowledge and are mostly 
from the same actor network. They have little influence over the design, monitoring 
and evaluation procedures, reinforcing existing structures of power. Within the group, 
only a few participants discuss and shape goals and share information through the use 
of a facilitator so prevailing norms are protected. Information distribution is generally 
suppressed within the group as well as from outsiders.  
Boundary type 
A boundary experiment adheres to the principles of democracy and legitimacy by 
opening itself up to any actor- state or non-state- that has a desire to be involved in 
policy making. It is initiated by a collaboration of actors and generates diverse 
knowledge types, including ordinary and practical knowledge from non-experts, 
making it more responsive to policy needs. This policy relevant knowledge is also 
subject to an extended societal peer review (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) as non-state 
actors have influence and decision power over the experiment’s design, monitoring, 
and evaluation. Reflexivity is high in a boundary experiment because participants 
contribute to the discussion on appropriate goals and whether the experiment adheres 
to acceptable societal aims. Deliberative practices are encouraged with transparent 
information transmission, open dialogue, and regular communication among 
participants.  
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Table 2 The difference in rule settings for each ideal type. 
Rules Indicator Technocratic  Boundary Advocacy 
Boundary Actor 
Inclusiveness 
All / predominantly 
all expert actors 
All actor types 
involved 
All / predominantly all 
policy actors 
 Accessibility to 
experiment 
Invited by initiator Requested 
involvement 
Have organiser 
role/obliged 
 Group members 
already met 
Some  No Yes 
 Openness to new 
participants 
Marginally/ some 
allowed 
Open Marginally/ closed 
Position Stakeholder role No stakeholders Interested 
parties as 
stakeholders 
Few stakeholders 
 Initiator role Expert actors Collaboration of 
actors 
Policy actors 
 Use of facilitator Not used Used Used for select parties 
Informa-
tion 
Contribution to 
goals 
No one All actors Few actors 
 Lay knowledge 
contributed 
None Yes, often 
solely 
Some, but not solely 
 Scientific 
knowledge 
contributed 
Majority Some Marginally 
 Amount 
information 
received 
Majority found 
sufficient 
Everyone found 
sufficient 
Minority found 
sufficient 
 Opportunity for 
personal contact 
Sometimes Often Rarely 
Choice Authority at 
decision nodes 
Expert initiators Shared power Policy initiators 
Pay-off How costs 
distributed 
Minimal buy-in Buy-in No buy-in 
Aggrega-
tion 
How decisions 
made 
Experts by majority Everyone by 
consensus 
Policy actor by 
majority 
3.1 Hypotheses 
With these variables in mind, the hypothesis proposes that an experiment ideal type 
has influence over subsequent learning effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Experiment ideal types have an effect on the learning outcomes of a policy 
experiment. 
Ideal Types 
Technocratic ideal type 
Boundary ideal type 
Advocacy ideal type 
Learning effects 
Cognitive learning 
Normative learning 
Relational learning 
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This hypothesis is informed by design factors uplifted from the learning literature, in 
particular the field of social learning (figure 2). Several factors that are said to 
contribute to learning, with the relevant ones in effect being tested here. They include 
a diversity of actors to share knowledge and views; open and sustained exchange of 
information; control over the process/joint fact-finding; facilitation; and consensus 
decision making (Mostert et al. 2007; Gerlak and Heikkila 2011; Muro and Jeffrey 
2012; Leach et al. 2013; Baird et al. 2014). Control factors would be those beyond the 
scope of institutional design choices; for instance, a charismatic leader, demographics, 
the participants’ willingness to learn, and media attention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Specific factors from the literature that are varied in the ideal types to see 
if they create different learning effects. 
With its low participant diversity and myopic focus on generating generalizable 
scientific evidence a technocratic design will generate high levels of cognitive learning 
but low normative learning. The relatively open exchange of information and shared 
authority allows for some relational learning. An advocacy design allows for diversity in 
actor types but their influence is very low and information is not openly shared, 
generating some cognitive and normative learning but low levels of relational learning 
among the group. A boundary experiment has high levels of normative and relational 
learning because of the focus on diverse actors openly contributing knowledge and 
views while sharing authority, financial buy-in from the participants, and the use of a 
facilitator. However, cognitive learning is somewhat affected by the drive to produce 
reflexive information over instrumental, scientific information.  
With these theoretical underpinnings, the test hypothesis can be broken into sub-
hypotheses: 
A technocratic experiment produces the highest levels of cognitive learning, 
lowest normative learning, and some relational learning within the circle of 
participants in the experiment. 
An advocacy experiment produces some cognitive learning, some normative 
learning, and the lowest levels of relational learning. 
A boundary experiment produces some cognitive learning and the highest 
levels of normative and relational learning within the circle of participants in 
the experiment. 
In order to test the validity of these hypotheses, 18 experiments were analysed, with 
the methods and results presented in the following sections. 
Learning factors 
Diverse participation 
Diverse knowledge types 
Information exchange 
Process control/buy-in 
Open communication 
Facilitation 
 
 
Opportunity for 
interaction 
 
Learning effects 
Cognitive learning 
Normative learning 
Relational learning 
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4 Methods 
The search for policy experiments was conducted throughout various institutions of 
the Netherlands, with a focus on the country’s water authorities (“water boards”). 
Climate adaptation is increasingly understood as a matter of urgency in a lowland 
country such as the Netherlands, as it is particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise, 
flooding, salt-water intrusion, fresh water availability, and increased drought. The 
water boards sit at the regional level between local and provincial government and 
form a fourth institutional level that is, until recently, somewhat unique to the 
Netherlands. The main responsibilities of the water boards are the maintenance of 
dikes and dams, water quantity and water quality. For this report the first two tasks are 
seen as most relevant to climate adaptation.  
4.1 The changing practices of water boards 
The Dutch government see climate adaptation as a response to the water issues they 
face and there is an urgent political need to innovate with policy solutions to meet 
these concerns. Change is apparent; for instance with the issues of fresh water 
availability and drought. Traditionally the approach to water management was to drain 
the country of excess water. The use of land for farming required water levels to be as 
low as possible so vast, efficient drainage systems were built. With the threat of 
climate change and the development of knowledge about the link between surface and 
ground water (Kuks 2002), the focus has shifted into trying to store and maintain 
water on the land for longer periods. These changes require governance as well as 
technological responses, and experiments are carried out to test these ideas. Other 
examples of innovative changes in Dutch water management include the fashioning of 
policy concepts such as multi-functional land use, which combines flood reduction and 
nature management; dynamic coastal management and building with nature, which 
uses natural processes to reduce flood risk; and water husbandry, which encourages 
farmers to close the water cycle and be self-sufficient with the water they have.  
It is within the ambit of these responses that policy experiments were identified; 
however, it was not an easy task to designate a project either an experiment or some 
other type of project; e.g. a pilot project. The term is used quite freely in the academic 
literature, which is in part why this report was written, to try and understand what we 
really mean when we talk about experiments. The answer is we mean something 
specific, and actually rather rare. From an adaptive management perspective, 
Gunderson cites three reasons why experiments are uncommon: the natural system is 
not resilient to systematic testing; the social system (i.e. the political system) is 
inflexible; and there are significant technical challenges to designing experiments 
(Gunderson 1999). From the experience of hunting for them, it would appear the 
inflexibility (or unwillingness to fail, spend the money, spend the time) to experiment 
properly would be the most common reason. Nevertheless, a sample was obtained and 
analysed, and the criteria used to select experiments is outlined in the next section. 
4.2 Case selection 
Six criteria were used to identify experiments: whether the project was testing for 
effects; whether it was innovative with uncertain outcomes; whether it had policy 
relevance; whether there was state involvement; whether it was eliciting an ecosystem 
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response, and whether it was relevant to climate adaptation. These six are elaborated 
on in turn. 
Drawing from the literature, a policy experiment is expected to test causal claims, to 
the extent that it is able and that proponents perceive this as possible (a substantial 
body of literature has developed around the arguments for and against experimental 
evaluation to assess claims). Essentially, this test for causality is what separates 
experiments from other types of pilot projects, and why they are considered a superior 
form of evidence. However, experimenting to establish causal effects of policy changes 
is more straightforward in social and economic policy than environmental policy. When 
assessing the social system the treatments are applied to randomly chosen human 
actors and this can be done relatively easily, compared to the thicket of variables that 
need to be controlled for if randomness and control groups are attempted in the 
social-ecological system. Moreover, regular state of the environment assessments 
mean that the ecological system is being monitored anyway and provides evidence for 
the effectiveness of environmental policies so further controlled evaluations could be 
seen as superfluous. Policy experiments are different from other projects by their 
status as pilots; however, pilot projects and policy experiments are not the same thing. 
The differentiation arguably lies in the extent of monitoring and evaluation. Calling a 
project a pilot infers that it is temporary, or first, but most pilots are not monitored for 
effects, or even evaluated. A significant proportion are used for demonstration rather 
than testing (Sanderson 2002). It is argued here that there is room for a definition of 
experiment between a strict experimental design and a demonstration, which would be 
indicated by the presence of a monitoring and evaluation framework. The evaluation 
may only be of the ecosystem response, but thorough experiments will assess the 
social acceptance, or buy-in, of the social system as well. 
Second, an experiment tests a policy innovation, in the sense of a long term alteration 
in policy or management practice as opposed to a mere adjustment of current 
practices (Duijn 2009). Policy innovations emerge from a significant concern- e.g. 
climate change, economic crisis- where incumbent solutions are not enough and policy 
makers are willing to imagine innovations that are then tested by experiment.  
Third, a policy relevant innovation relates to a new policy concept or approach, 
indicated by a significant departure from the norm. This can come in the form of a new 
policy concept; such as building with nature or multi-functional land use, whereby 
experiments are original manifestations of the new concept in practice; or a new 
approach, like the shift from the state being responsible for water management to 
users, or the practice of storing water within the system instead of draining it. 
The final three criteria were whether there was state involvement (specifically water 
boards), whether the experiment straddled the social ecological system by eliciting an 
ecosystem response, and whether it was relevant to climate adaptation. State 
involvement is important to declare an experiment policy relevant, and water boards 
were chosen because of their specific focus on water management, intention to 
innovate due to recently divested responsibilities, long-term focus on water 
management, and the fact they were involved in nearly every project assessed. Cases 
were looked for by searching for phrases such as: test pilots, innovation, experiment, 
“proef, onderzoek, pilot, on programme websites, ministry, province and water board 
websites, and mentioned in scoping interviews. Projects that were deemed irrelevant 
included product testing, concept pilots, modelling projects, and reapplications of the 
initial experiment.  
174 innovative pilot cases were identified according to the criteria and 18 cases were 
selected as meeting all six criteria, the most uncommon criteria being a monitoring 
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and evaluation framework and climate adaptation relevance. The cases have different 
spatial and temporal scales and deal with different problems, however, they are 
comparable due to their meeting these stringent criteria. 
Experiment cases 
The 18 cases of experimentation in Dutch climate adaptation test policy innovations in 
coastal and inland defence, flooding, and drought related issues. They date between 
1997 – 2012 and nearly half are ongoing. Ongoing cases are included if they have 
passed at least one evaluation phase. The names of the experiments are not given to 
honour confidentiality; however, map 1 below illustrates the location of the 
experiments in the Netherlands and the colour of the stars shows what water issues 
they relate to. Yellow stars indicate coastal experiments, blue stars water availability 
experiments, purple is multi-functional land use experiments, orange stars delineate 
water variability experiments, and the red stars show dike management experiments, 
with the red star delineating an experiment that is being conducted throughout the 
country. 
The following sections detail data collection and survey protocols that were followed. 
 
Map 1 Map of the Netherlands showing locations of each experiment case. Yellow 
stars show location of 5 coastal management experiments; purple stars 
show 4 water storage experiments; blue stars show three freshwater 
experiments; orange stars show three water variability experiments; and 2 
red stars show dike management experiments. The giant red star denotes 
an experiment conducted in several regions of the country.  
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5 Data collection 
Participants of the experiments were identified during interviews with project leaders 
and analyses of project reports. Participant numbers varied across cases, with the 
smallest having eight participants and the highest with 40. Experiment participants 
were sent via email an online survey with 64 closed questions, which asked about their 
role in the experiment, their opinions on design aspects, and questions to gauge their 
learning experiences. Three reminder emails were sent at weekly intervals. A total of 
265 survey emails were sent out and 170 were completed, giving a 64% response rate. 
Each case either had a minimum of 6 responses or responses from over half of known 
participants.  
Survey design 
The respondents were asked a mixture of factual and attitudinal questions to gauge 
the setting of the institutional rules; including questions about the role of the 
respondent, the design of the experiment, the other participants, power structures, 
and financing of the project. Control questions were also asked; including how 
controversial the project was, competency of the initiator, legal barriers, and media 
attention.  
Learning assessment 
Table 3 states the learning variables measured, the survey questions/statements used 
to measure the learning variables and the correlation statistic for each set. All sets of 
questions were significantly correlated (0.19 < r < 0.48) so they were grouped together 
to reduce the number of variables from 11 to 6. The analysis treats the scales as 
continuous. The questions follow closely the conceptual framework in table 1 above. 
  
 IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
 22  Data collection 
    
 
Table 3 Questions asked to gauge learning and correlations cores to justify 
grouping. 
Cognitive learning 1- participant’s knowledge acquisition. 
Scale: -2= strongly disagree; -1= disagree; 0=neutral; 1= agree; 2= strongly agree.  
I gained new factual information from the experiment. 
Through participating in the experiment, I gained better insight into the manner in which environmental 
problems can be solved. 
Correlation= 0.28 (sig.) 
Cognitive learning 2- participant’s improved complexity of understanding. 
Scale: -2= Not at all; -1= Slightly; 0=A certain extent; 1= Strongly; 2= Very great extent.  
By participating in the experiment, did you improve your personal knowledge of the natural system in 
question? 
To what extent have the results of the experiment surprised you and forced you to amend your initial 
expectations about the outcomes of the intervention? 
Correlation= 0.35 (sig.) 
Normative learning 1- participant/group change in priorities. 
Scale: -2= strongly disagree; -1= disagree; 0=neutral; 1= agree; 2= strongly agree.  
Participating in the experiment has changed the importance I attach to environmental issues. 
Participating in the experiment has changed the importance others attach to environmental issues. 
Correlation= 0.19 (sig.) 
Normative learning 2- group formed common interest. 
Scale: -2= strongly disagree; -1= disagree; 0=neutral; 1= agree; 2= strongly agree. 
The experiment ensured that participants discovered a common goal. 
Relational learning 1- participant better understood others’ mind-sets 
Scale: -2= strongly disagree; -1= disagree; 0=neutral; 1= agree; 2= strongly agree. 
As a result of the experiment I got a better understanding of the mind-sets of other participants. 
Even though differences remain, I have developed a bond with my opponents by participating in the 
experiment. 
Correlation= 0.34 (sig.) 
Relational learning 2- participant/group increased trust  
Scale: -2= strongly disagree; -1= disagree; 0=neutral; 1= agree; 2= strongly agree. 
As a result of the experiment a mutual trust has grown between participants. 
I would participate again in an experiment with these participants. 
Correlation= 0.48 (sig.) 
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6 Results 
This section first evaluates whether learning took place in the sample, then it assesses 
the ideal type for each experiment before comparing the ideal type characteristics 
found in the sample with those defined conceptually earlier in the paper. The next step 
is the statistical analysis, which establishes to what extent the ideal types (ipso facto 
the varied institutional designs) explain the differences- if any- in learning scores 
between the experiments. 
First, to what extent did learning take place in the sample? Table 4 sets out the mean 
and standard deviation for each learning variable. These results show that on average, 
participants in the experiments learned. The gaining of knowledge and improvement 
in trust scored highest, with the changing of priorities clearly scoring lowest. In line 
with previous studies, normative learning proved difficult to achieve (Leach et al. 2013; 
Baird et al. 2014). 
Table 4 Learning scores for the six types. Scale used: -2= strongly disagree; -1= 
disagree; 0=neutral; 1= agree; 2= strongly agree1. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Cognitive learning- knowledge acquisition 
(CL1) 
153 -1.5 2 0.7 0.65 
Cognitive learning- improve understanding 
(CL2) 
153 -2 2 0.0 0.7 
Normative learning- priorities (NL1) 152 -2 1.5 -0.1 0.64 
Normative learning- convergence (NL2) 152 -2 2 0.6 0.71 
Relational learning- understand other’s 
mind-sets (RL1) 
152 -1.5 2 0.3 0.59 
Relational learning- trust (RL2) 152 -2 2 0.8 0.75 
 
Next, 21 indicators were identified to assess the cases based on an experiment’s 
institutional design. As explained in the concept section, the indicators have three rule 
settings, one for each ideal type. Table 1 above sets out how the indicators 
conceptually delineate ideal types, and Appendix A lists a more detailed breakdown of 
indicators by rule category and their setting for each ideal type. 
In order to determine what type an experiment is, the experiments were assessed and 
given a score for each indicator. The scores correlate with a particular setting, and the 
experiment is labelled the ideal type that its scores best correspond to. For example, 
Experiment 2 had three scores for technocratic, 14 scores for boundary, and 4 scores 
for advocacy type; thus it is a boundary experiment. The assessment concludes that 
for the 18 cases, four experiments meet the technocratic definition, seven are 
boundary experiments, and seven are advocacy experiments (table 5 below).  
Table 5: Number of cases that fall into each ideal type. 
  
                                                          
1 Cognitive learning 2 used a different scale, -2= Not at all; -1= Slightly; 0=A certain extent; 1= Strongly; 2= Very 
great extent. 
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Table 5: Number of cases that fall into each ideal type. 
Ideal type 
Number of experiments that meet the 
type 
Technocratic 4 
Boundary 7 
Advocacy 7 
 
For a visual representation of the categorization see figure 3, which shows each case 
plotted in a ternary plot. Red crosses are cases with mostly boundary characteristics; 
green crosses are technocratic cases; and blue are cases with mostly advocacy 
characteristics. The placements are calculated by plotting in the triangle what scores 
for each type the experiments gained. Figure 3 shows that it is uncommon for cases to 
fall absolutely into one type. It is more common for cases to display characteristics of 
two types, hence some of the cases are hovering towards the middle of the figure. The 
figure also shows that experiments tend not to have technocratic scores compared to 
the other types. Despite these findings, the plot shows that cases do cluster based on 
the indicator assessment and that three types can be identified.  
 
Figure 3 ternary plot to illustrate how the cases fall into one of three ideal types.  
Table 6 shows how the experiments scored in relation to the ideal types. It sets out the 
experiment scores for each indicator and shows which ideal type was most common 
for the different indicators.  
The first set of indicators are for the position rules, which prescribe what sorts of 
positions participants can take in the experiment. The sample showed that for the 
position rules the most common ideal type is the advocacy type. The technocratic type 
is least common. For example, only one experiment had experts initiate the 
experiment, with most being initiated by policy actors. The next set of rules are the 
authority rules, where the three different decision nodes are about design choices, 
monitoring and implementation, and evaluation. Here the technocratic type is most 
common, because experts are generally taking decisions at these nodes (often in 
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conjunction with another actor type). Advocacy experiments also scored high, when 
policy actors take decisions. The least common is the boundary type, where three or 
more actor types make decisions together on specific nodes. This indicates that joint 
decision making and process control are rare. 
Information rules prescribe what sorts of information is generated and the distribution 
of that information. Here the boundary type is most common, as actors generally felt 
they received sufficient information and that it was openly shared amongst all 
participants, which is a surprise since it was expected that answers for this variable 
would be more diverse. Reflexivity, the extent goals are discussed and shaped by 
participants, scored highest for advocacy types because generally only a select group 
of participants shared their views on goals. Aggregation rules describe how decisions 
are made- whether they are unilateral or shared, for generic decisions about amending 
or ending the project. Again, advocacy experiments score best, which means most 
experiments had unilateral decision structure as opposed to shared or consensual.  
Payoff rules prescribe the extent there is buy-in from participants or whether the 
initiator pays costs, with technocratic experiments, those where expert actors are 
paying for the experiment, score best. Finally, boundary rules determine who is let into 
the experiment, and thereby involved in the policy process, and who is left out. The 
results show that experiments that are predominantly expert are most uncommon, 
with most cases involving several actor types. However, around half the participants 
knew each other, with slightly more actor groups being produced than being 
reinforced. The cases were also more likely to allow new participants to join during the 
experiment than not. However, more cases had closed access, meaning participants 
had to be invited into the project, with only 6 cases having participants that requested 
entry. 
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Table 6 How the ideal types score with each set of indicators derived from 
institutional rules. 
Rule type Identifier Indicator 
TIT 
score 
BIT 
score 
AIT score 
Position 1A Stakeholder position 2 8 8 
 1B Initiator type 1 10 7 
 1C Use of facilitator 5 3 10 
Authority 2A Design authority 8 2 6 
 2B 
Monitoring and evaluation 
authority 
7 3 6 
 2C Evaluation authority 8 1 9 
Information 3A Reflexive discussion on goals 2 6 10 
 3B Extent of lay knowledge  3 7 8 
 3C Extent of scientific knowledge 8 5 5 
 3D Sufficient information sharing 4 12 2 
 3E Information openly shared 6 11 1 
 3F Extent personal contact 6 11 1 
 3G Outsiders informed 5 11 2 
Aggregation 4A Amend power 3 4 11 
 4B End power 3 5 10 
Payoff 5A Cost distribution 8 6 4 
Boundary 6A Inclusiveness 3 7 8 
 6B New actor group 8 6 4 
 6C Describe others 5 8 5 
 6D Openness to others 7 8 3 
 6E Access 5 6 7 
 
The analysis above highlights what indicators of the conceptual ideal types (as 
described in table 2) are most common empirically. Most surprising is the diversity of 
actors and information generated, and how open the participants found the 
information distribution process. More stakeholders were involved than expected, and 
it is interesting to see how collaborative the initiators were. With such diversity it is 
surprising that so few experiments had consistent facilitation, or that few new actor 
networks emerged. However, the authority distribution is very low for non-state and 
non-expert actors, which reveals that although diverse actor groups are involved their 
influence is fairly narrow. 
The assessment above described the set of experiments under analysis and how their 
design characteristics differ within the sample. In order to test the hypotheses, the 
next step is to compare the learning scores of the different types. 
Ideal types and learning 
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the learning effects and 
ideal types. The alternative hypotheses are that there is a relationship, and that 
cognitive learning is significantly higher in technocratic experiments compared to the 
other types, and normative and relational learning is significantly higher in boundary 
experiments compared to the other types. As a refresher, the hypotheses to be tested 
are shown here in Table 7:  
  
 IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
Are we Learning-by-Doing Policy Experiments? 27 
    
 
Table 7 Expected levels of learning for each ideal type. 
 Cognitive learning Normative learning Relational learning 
H1: Technocratic type Highest Lowest Middle 
H2: Boundary type Middle Highest Highest 
H3: Advocacy type Lowest Middle  Lowest 
 
Table 8 shows the learning scores for each ideal type, with the learning classification 
beneath to check against the hypotheses. The table shows that technocratic 
experiments generate levels of cognitive learning that meet expectations. There is 
some normative learning in TITs, which is contrary to H1, and relational learning 
partially meets expectations. H2 predicted highest relational and normative learning 
scores for boundary experiments, which is confirmed by results; however, the low 
cognitive learning scores are a surprise. Finally, H3 expected the advocacy 
experiments to have the least learning, and their low normative learning meets 
expectations and relational learning partially. However, advocacy experiments produce 
quite a bit more cognitive learning than anticipated. Table 9 illustrates where the 
hypotheses are correct and where they are incorrect. 
Table 8 Means of learning scores for each ideal type. 
 CL1 CL2 NL1 NL2 RL1 RL2 
Technocratic 
type 
0.95 0.65 -0,1 0.6 0.15 0.75 
 Highest Highest Middle Middle Lowest Middle 
Boundary type 0.6 -0,2 0.0 0.8 0.5 0.9 
 Lowest Lowest Highest Highest Highest Highest 
Advocacy type 0.7 -0,1 -0,2 0.5 0.2 0.7 
 Middle Middle Lowest Lowest Middle Lowest 
 
Table 9: Whether the learning means confirm or do not confirm the research 
hypotheses. 
 Cognitive learning Normative learning Relational learning 
H1: Technocratic type  X X/  
H2: Boundary type X   
H3: Advocacy type X X X /  
 
The results above assume that the model is robust. In order to test whether the 
different learning scores are in fact a result of the delineation of types, a one-way 
ANOVA, robust ANOVA Welch Test, and post-hoc tests (Tukey and Games Howell) were 
conducted. Table 10 sets out the results (significant results in bold). 
The results show that the scores for normative learning 1 (priorities) and 2 (common 
interest) and relational learning 2 (trust) cannot be explained by the different ideal 
types and we cannot statistically reject the null hypothesis.  
However, for cognitive learning 1 and 2 and relational learning 1, there was a 
statistically significant difference between means (p < .05) so the null hypothesis is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted for these learning variables. Post hoc 
tests show there will be a significant increase in knowledge acquisition (CL1) if the 
experiment is a technocratic experiment and not a boundary experiment. Post hoc 
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tests for CL2 state significantly that if the experiment is a technocratic type then 
participants will improve their existing understanding of the facts. Finally, results show 
that the differences in understanding mind-sets (RL1) are significant between the 
types, but whether one is superior is not significant.  
Table 10 Results of ANOVA analysis and post-hoc tests for each of the learning 
effects. 
CL1- Knowledge acquisition Cognitive learning 1 was statistically significantly different 
between different ideal types, F(2,150) = 3.325, p < .0039. There 
was homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's Test of 
Homogeneity of Variance (p = .122). Data is presented as mean ± 
standard deviation. Cognitive learning 1 improves from the 
boundary (0.6 ± 0.7), to advocacy (0.7 ± 0.6), to technocratic (1.0 ± 
0.5) types, in that order. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that 
the mean increase from boundary to technocratic (0.37, 95% CI 
[0.03, 0.7]) was statistically significant (p = .029) but no other 
group differences were statistically significant. 
CL2- Increased complexity 
in understanding 
Cognitive learning 2 was statistically significantly different 
between different ideal types, F(2,150) = 19.018, p < .0005. 
There was homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's Test of 
Homogeneity of Variance (p = .353). Data is presented as mean ± 
standard deviation. Cognitive learning 2 improves from the 
boundary (-0.2 ± 0.7), to advocacy (-0.1 ± 0.6), to technocratic (0.6 
± 0.5) types, in that order. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that 
the mean increase from boundary to technocratic (0.85, 95% CI 
[0.5, 1.18]) was statistically significant (p = .0005), and the 
mean increase from advocacy to technocratic (0.72, 95% CI 
[0.36 – 1.07] was statistically significant (p= .0005), but no other 
group differences were statistically significant. 
NL1- Change in priorities Normative learning 1 increased from the advocacy (-0.20 ± 0.6), to 
technocratic (-0.09 ± 0.7) to boundary (0.01 ± 0.7) ideal types, in 
that order, but the differences between the ideal types was not 
statistically significant, F(2,0.704) = 1.748, p = .178. 
NL2- Forming of common 
interest 
Normative learning 2 increased from the advocacy (0.49 ± 0.8), to 
technocratic (0.57± 0.6) to boundary (0.77 ± 0.7) ideal types, in that 
order, but the differences between the ideal types was not 
statistically significant, Welch's F(2, 76.9) = 2.204, p = .117. 
RL1- Understanding of 
mind-sets 
Relational learning 1 was statistically significantly different 
between different ideal types, Welch's F(2, 65) = 4.058, p < .022. 
The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as 
assessed by Levene’s Test of Homogeneity of Variance (p = .048). 
Data is presented as mean ± standard deviation. Relational learning 
1 improves from the technocratic (0.1 ± 0.7), to advocacy (0.2 ± 
0.8), to boundary (0.5± 0.6) types, in that order. Games-Howell post-
hoc analysis revealed that none of the changes were statistically 
significant (although the increase from technocratic to boundary 
type (0.36, 95% CI (-0.012 – 0.731)) was almost statistically 
significant (p = .067), as well as the increase from advocacy to 
boundary type (0.3, 95% CI (-0.023-0.616), p = .074). 
RL2- Increase in trust Relational learning 2 increased from the advocacy 0.72 ± 0.8), to 
technocratic (0.77± 0.6) to boundary (0.91 ± 0.5) ideal types, in that 
order, but the differences between the ideal types was not 
statistically significant, Welch's F(2, 64.2) = 1.659, p = .198. 
 
 IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
Are we Learning-by-Doing Policy Experiments? 29 
    
 
7 Discussion 
The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between policy experiments 
and policy learning using an original conceptual model that connects three different 
institutional design settings and three different learning effects. Results of an online 
survey from 170 participants in 18 cases revealed that experiments can be categorised 
as either technocratic, boundary, or advocacy types; with advocacy and boundary types 
being most common. The hypotheses were partially met, with some unexpected 
results that will now be reflected on with discussion regarding implications for theory.  
The first point relates to the finding that experiments produce learning effects, which 
is a welcome one, if not wholly unsurprising. Knowledge acquisition and increased 
complexity in understanding meets with the assumption in adaptive management that 
experiments provide knowledge to reduce uncertainties (Cundill & Rodela 2012). The 
scores for trust building and better understanding others’ mind-sets also chimes with 
theories that experiments can also provide platforms for new actor groups to solve 
policy problems together (K. Lee 1999). However, the scores for a change in the 
importance a participant or the group attaches to environmental issues were woefully 
low, despite boundary experiments containing a diverse set of actors with shared 
authority, exposure to a range of different knowledge types and discussions on goals, 
with open communication and sufficient knowledge exchange.  
Caution can be raised as to the methods of measuring what is in effect deliberative 
processes using quantitative methods (Haug et al. 2011), but this does not completely 
undermine the clear result. Moreover, it is much in line with previous learning studies. 
Haug et al. (2011) found no evidence of normative learning from conducting a policy 
game exercise. Likewise, Munaretto & Huitema (2012) found no evidence of normative 
learning from experiments conducted in the Venice lagoon. Leach et al. (2013) 
recorded significantly more cognitive then normative learning in their study on 
collaborative partnerships, and normative learning was absent from the adaptive co-
management learning study conducted recently by Baird et al. (2014). What reasons 
can be given for its scarcity? One possibility is proffered here, based on the evidence 
that an actor involved as a concerned individual in a personal capacity was significantly 
more likely to change their priorities than any other actor, particularly an expert or 
business actor. This implies that some actor types may be more willing or open to 
questioning or changing their priorities, with those who consider themselves 
knowledgeable in the field being more reluctant to admit to a value shift (Haug et al. 
2011). However, this does not explain why business actors experienced the least 
normative learning. An alternative explanation is that norms and belief systems 
underlie our positions and actions and the more “face” to lose the more defensive we 
are of our beliefs, especially in a professional situation dealing with actual policy 
concerns. This assumption contrasts the one made by Baird et al. (2014) that time is 
the major factor in producing normative learning (a finding not replicated here), and 
brings up questions regarding how unfeasible it is to expect normative learning in 
situations where, despite a deliberative setting, there is no practical solution to getting 
around defences that protect actor interests. Moreover, normative learning does not 
imply an improvement, just a change, and the adjustment of norms and values could 
also be the result of persuasion tactics by more powerful actors (Haug et al. 2011). In 
light of all this, perhaps an improvement in understanding of the facts, in the 
understanding others’ mind-sets, and a growth of trust is enough to address the 
complexity and uncertainty that shroud climate policy problems and should bare more 
of the focus in policy research. 
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The second point of discussion reflects on the use of the conceptual framework to 
model reality and predict learning effects. The positioning of experiments at the 
science-policy nexus to study learning was arguably novel (compared to recent 
learning studies that follow the general trend of analysing participatory settings) but it 
stemmed from an assumption that experiments most likely embody the technocratic 
model. Therefore it was a surprise that not more cases fitted this type, especially when 
one of the criteria for the cases was that they test an ecosystem response. It was the 
least common design in most of the indicators measured, with far more experiments 
having boundary type characteristics than assumed. This could reflect the nature of 
the Dutch ‘polder model’, which embodies consensual negotiated knowledge (Owens 
et al. 2004) and that experiments play more of a role in producing socially robust 
knowledge than previously thought (Nowotny 2003). With post-normal science 
considered a more superior mode of knowledge governance for wicked problems than 
traditional forms (Petersen et al. 2011) this is a strong win for proponents of using the 
experimental method to test policy concepts. 
It cannot be ignored, however, that the advocacy experiment was also common. This 
implies that policy actors may be using the tool as a way to skim over ethical and 
political choices by framing issues as technical and requiring experimental testing 
without questioning norms or power structures (Owens et al. 2004). However, despite 
the indicators for power structure and actor inclusiveness being typically advocacy 
type, there were no deep underlying divisions detected in the cases. The information 
transmission in all cases was generally considered open and transparent by 
participants, and no claims were made about crucial parties being omitted from the 
process, nor that the experiment was conducted to defer a policy decision (5 
participants claimed this as the reason for the experiment, and 4 were policy actors). 
Therefore, although a fair portion of the cases were advocacy types, they were not of a 
sinister kind. Advocacy types were also significantly less likely to be controversial, 
have legal barriers, or cause concern in the surrounding area compared to the other 
types, indicating that policy actors may use advocacy experiments for structured, 
uncontentious problem issues (as opposed to technocratic types, as expected by 
Owens et al. 2004). 
Finally, a few points can be made about how the design influenced learning outcomes. 
The results confirmed that technocratic experiments produce significantly more 
cognitive learning, and it is somewhat surprising that boundary types produced less 
than advocacy types. Is it possible that transparent, deliberative, and inclusive policy 
processes supress knowledge acquisition? Three explanations are possible. First, 
boundary experiments have a range of actor types and the lack of prior knowledge or 
the analytic sophistication of an expert could drag down the cognitive learning scores. 
However, Leach et al. (2013) counters this proposition, as in their study those with 
lower competence actually learned more. A second explanation could follow van 
Eeten’s dialogue of the deaf metaphor, where long standing policy controversies 
between sides in the policy community render them unable to resolve issues using the 
facts (Eeten 1999). People talk but do not listen, so they cannot learn. However, 
checking the extent to which the experiments were dealing with controversial issues, 
results show that although boundary experiments were more controversial than 
advocacy experiments, the technocratic experiments were significantly more 
controversial. Therefore, this explanation is possible but weak. The third explanation 
involves the offsetting of instrumental vs reflexive knowledge. Bivariate statistics show 
that experiments with a high number of participants that discussed goals of the 
project had significantly less cognitive learning. Somehow, the more an experiment 
engages participants in the discussion on goals, the less knowledge and 
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understanding produced. This finding has implications for the somewhat clear cut 
argument in policy sciences that combining the consideration of both fact and values 
in an experiment would be of benefit (Dryzek 1987; Fischer 1995), and further 
research (preferably of an in-depth, qualitative nature) needs to be conducted to shine 
light on this trade-off. 
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8 Conclusions 
The intention of the article is to present a conceptual framework siting policy 
experiments at the science-policy interface and linking their design features to 
preferred learning outcomes, in order to answer the research question: to what extent 
can policy learning be explained by an experiment’s institutional design? The results 
show that design goes far in explaining what sort of and how much learning is 
produced.  
For the purposes of this research, policy experiments are defined as a temporary, 
controlled field-trial of a policy-relevant innovation that produces evidence for 
subsequent policy decisions. Eighteen cases were identified out of an initial 174 
innovative initiatives in Dutch climate adaptation, indicating that policy 
experimentation is actually rather rare in climate governance. The cases tested policy 
concepts in coastal, freshwater, and flooding, drought management. Out of 18 cases, 
four fit the description of a technocratic ideal type, which are those that separate 
science from power. Seven experiments fit the boundary type, which embody 
transparent, deliberative, and inclusive processes; and seven fit the advocacy ideal 
type, which are driven by policy actors and restrict information exchange and authority 
distribution. The technocratic experiments produced significantly high cognitive 
learning, some normative learning, and some relational learning, partially meeting the 
hypothesis. Boundary experiments produced the lowest cognitive learning, and highest 
amounts of normative and relational learning. Their levels of relational learning were 
significantly higher than others but the low cognitive learning was a surprise. Finally, 
meeting expectations, the advocacy experiments produced low levels of normative and 
relational learning, but the cognitive learning was higher than expected. Cognitive and 
relational learning scores were significant among the groups, confirming that for these 
effects design has an effect on how much learning is produced. 
The discussion shows that experiments in Dutch climate adaptation are more likely to 
entwine the fields of policy and science and produce policy-relevant knowledge than be 
set apart from the policy process and produce solely scientific evidence. An 
experiment turns out of be a successful method of involving non-state actors in the 
policy process, although their authority to make decisions is considerably limited. 
Based on the learning results, it is concluded that initiators need to think carefully 
when designing an experiment, in particular who is involved, how much power they 
have, and what information is transmitted and who to, because the findings show that 
when designing experiments there is essentially a trade-off between building trust 
among participants and increasing their knowledge acquisition. How to get 
participants to change their values and beliefs is another question, as the results show 
that experiments do not tend to enable this learning effect.  
A study on learning would not be complete without the requisite limitations section. 
Obviously there are caveats to be drawn regarding how valid learning data is when 
gathered ex post, via self-reported learning methods. This is why an attempt to be as 
standardised and thorough as possible was made, with closed questions and a range 
of question types; for example, asking factual questions about a participant’s 
authority, as well as about their opinion on how open the experiment was to outsiders. 
The learning questions were based on previously published studies, although had to 
be made intentionally vague so to capture the content of different experiments. 
Quantitative analysis paints with broad strokes and picks up patterns across many 
cases, but qualitative research is superior to find underlying dynamics and reasons for 
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learning. Finally, despite a comprehensive search for experiments, it would be unwise 
to extrapolate findings to experiments in policy at a whole, due to the purposive, 
snow-ball sampling strategy.  
Further research into the relationship between experiments and learning could 
examine how the policy network reacts to these sorts of initiatives. Do the ideal types 
create different perceptions of how credible, salient, or legitimate the experiment’s 
evidence is? If an experiment has high learning scores does this translate into impact 
on the wider policy network? Further work could also push forward the connections 
identified in this article or reapply the framework to individual cases. The relationship 
between learning and experimentation is often assumed but exploration is in its 
infancy, if it grow up then climate governance will be the better for it. 
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Annex A   
 Indicator Explanation Settings 
Position 
rules 
   
1A Respondents in 
stakeholder role 
Extent participants identify 
themselves as stakeholders. 
BIT= >50% 
AIT= 20-50% 
TIT= <20% 
1B Initiator type What actor type initiated the 
experiment.  
BIT= collaboration 
between two or more 
actor types. 
AIT= policy actor 
TIT= expert actor 
1C Facilitator involvement How many participants recall 
the presence of an 
independent facilitator during 
the experiment. 
BIT= >66% recall 
AIT= 20-65% recall 
TIT= <20% recall. 
Choice rules    
2A Design decisions Analysis of how the authority 
to make decisions on design 
was distributed among the 
actor types. 
BIT= collaboration 
between more than two 
parties. 
AIT= policy actor only. 
TIT= expert actor only; 
expert driven 
2B Monitoring decisions Analysis of how the authority 
to make decisions on 
monitoring and 
implementation was 
distributed among the actor 
types. 
BIT= collaboration 
between more than two 
parties/ pol with other 
parties. 
AIT= policy actor 
majority 
TIT= expert majority; 
collaboration between 
expert and policy. 
2C Evaluation decisions Analysis of how the authority 
to make decisions on 
evaluation was distributed 
among the actor types. 
BIT= collaboration 
between more than two 
parties/ pol with other 
parties. 
AIT= policy actor 
majority 
TIT= expert majority; 
collaboration between 
expert and policy. 
Information 
rules 
   
3A Contribute to goal 
discussion 
Percentage of participants 
that contributed to the 
discussion on project goals. 
 
BIT= > 75%  
AIT= 30-75%  
TIT= <30%  
3B Lay knowledge 
contribution 
Percentage of participants 
that (solely) contributed lay 
knowledge. 
BIT= >50% (at least one 
solely) 
AIT= 30-50% 
TIT= <30%  
3C Scientific knowledge 
contribution 
Percentage of participants 
that contributed scientific 
knowledge. 
 
TIT= >50% 
BIT= 25-50% 
AIT= <25% 
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3D Sufficient information 
sharing 
To what extent participants 
were satisfied with how much 
information was shared within 
the group. 
BIT= >75% agree 
(everyone found 
sufficient). 
AIT= >50% neutral or 
disagree (minority found 
sufficient). 
TIT= remaining (majority 
found sufficient). 
3E Information openly 
shared 
To what extent participants 
found the process of sharing 
information open among the 
group.  
BIT= >75% agree 
(everyone found 
sufficient). 
AIT= >50% neutral or 
disagree (minority found 
sufficient). 
TIT= remaining (majority 
found sufficient). 
3F Sufficient personal 
contact 
To what extent participants 
felt there was sufficient 
personal contact among the 
group. 
BIT= >75% agree 
(everyone found 
sufficient). 
AIT= >50% neutral or 
disagree (minority found 
sufficient). 
TIT= remaining (majority 
found sufficient). 
3G Outsiders informed of 
progress 
How regularly non-
participants were informed of 
the experiment’s progress. 
BIT= >75% state often 
informed. 
AIT= >50% state 
irregularly/not informed. 
TIT = remaining state 
somewhat informed. 
Aggregation 
rules 
How decisions are 
made- unilaterally or 
shared and by who if 
the former- 
  
4A Amend power How decisions are made about 
amending the experiment. 
Whether the power is shared 
among the group or decisions 
taken by initiators. 
Classification considers 
dominant actor type and who 
initiated. 
BIT= broad actor type 
sharing decision power. 
AIT= dominant policy 
actors sharing power, or 
policy actors as 
initiators. 
TIT= dominant expert 
actors sharing power, or 
expert actors as 
initiators. 
4B End power How decisions are made about 
ending the experiment. 
Whether the power is shared 
among the group or decisions 
taken by initiators. 
Classification considers 
dominant actor type and who 
initiated. 
 
BIT= broad actor type 
sharing decision power. 
AIT= dominant policy 
actors sharing power, or 
policy actors as 
initiators. 
TIT= dominant expert 
actors sharing power, or 
expert actors as 
initiators. 
Pay off 
rules 
   
5A How costs were 
distributed 
Look into how the costs of the 
experiment were paid; to what 
extent participants were 
BIT= costs were shared. 
AIT= a participant’s 
organization paid all 
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expected to “buy-in” to the 
experiment. 
 
costs or no costs. 
TIT= no clear distinction; 
some paid, some shared. 
Boundary 
rules 
   
6A Inclusiveness  Inclusiveness considers the 
breadth of actors, broadest 
being all five actor types. If 
there is no dominant actor, 
then four actor types is also 
broad. Dominant actor is one 
that equals or is more than 
other types together.  
BIT= All five actor types; 
or four with no 
dominance. 
AIT= Dominant policy 
actor, 2-4 other types.  
TIT= Dominant expert  
6B New actor network 
 
To what extent the 
participants have met each 
other before. 
 
BIT= >66% never met 
before or met less than 
half. 
AIT= >66% know 
everyone or met more 
than half. 
TIT= remainder. 
6C Describe other 
participants 
Participants asked to describe 
other actors in the group. 
BIT= enthusiastic for a 
new idea. 
AIT= actors needed to 
change policy/ a good 
link between science and 
policy. 
TIT= group of experts. 
6D Openness to new 
participants 
To what extent new 
participants can join the 
project once it has started.  
BIT= all new actors 
welcome or mostly 
welcome. 
AIT= no one welcome or 
marginally welcome. 
TIT= mixed. 
6E Gaining access How participants entered the 
experiment. Participants can 
either be invited in, involved 
because they are part of the 
organizing team, or because 
they requested involvement 
from the organisers. The most 
common method is used for 
classification, except if 
anyone requested 
involvement, then a BIT 
classification is used. 
BIT= Requested 
involvement 
AIT= Organiser/obliged 
TIT= Invited in 
 
